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The literature of mathematics education for social justice is
rich in well-elaborated and challenging examples. It is a
pleasure to dig into this inspiring educational productivity.
However, at times this literature reveals a certain degree of
conceptual laziness. Specifically, one seldom finds detailed
elaborations of the very notion of social justice.
It is convenient to use this notion in a common-sense for-
mulation. In fact, it appears superfluous to argue in favour of
a mathematics education for social justice: who would ever
try to argue in favour of a mathematics education for social
injustice? However, taking a closer look at the notion of social
justice, we soon come to realise tremendous complexity and a
diversity of interpretations. The notion of justice has deep
philosophic roots, and its possible meanings have been inter-
preted and reinterpreted ever since antiquity.
In this article, I am going to provide an interpretation of
a mathematics education for social justice, which on the
one hand relates to philosophic discussions of social jus-
tice, and on the other hand relates to classroom practices. I
see mathematics education for social justice as providing
opportunities for students to formulate visions and hopes
and in this way supporting them in articulating conceptions
of social justice.
In order to get to this understanding, I start out with an
example, Bolsa Familia, which I will refer to during the fol-
lowing discussions. Then I consider ethical realism and ethical
anarchism before formulating the position of ethical construc-
tivism. This constructivism provides the departure for my
interpretation of mathematics education for social justice.
Bolsa Familia
João Luiz Muzinatti teaches mathematics to students from
an upper-middle-class neighbourhood in São Paulo. He
organises some of his teaching as project work. One of the
projects concerned Bolsa Familia, which refers to a pro-
gramme of family support [1]. This programme was
implemented as part of the social programmes of PT (Par-
tido de Trabalhadores, The Workers’ Party) in order to
reduce the extreme poverty in Brazil.
When starting the project, Muzinatti asked his students
for their views about Bolsa Familia. A common reaction was
that this social programme was questionable, and further-
more, that an unequal distribution of wealth in society is
fair enough; those who are working more and have studied
more should also earn more. This claim was supported by
statements such as: poor people in general are lazy; if one
really wants to do something and to make progress in life,
it is possible; and Bolsa Familia provides a temptation for
lazy people to continue doing nothing.
As a next step in the project, Muzinatti presented more
information about the social programme, for instance about
how much a single family would get in financial support. Such
information surprised the students; they realised that one could
easily spend this amount of money on a single trip to a super-
market—and the money had to last for a whole month! With
such information available, the project became developed.
This example is similar to many examples of mathemat-
ics education for social justice. In the literature, one finds
examples pointing out the many forms of suppression,
exploitation, racism, sexism etc. that take place in our soci-
ety. What differentiates Bolsa Familia from most of these
examples, if not from all of them, is that while mathematics
education for social justice normally engages students that
suffer social injustices, Muzzinatti engages students in com-
fortable positions. He works with students who apparently
benefit from economic injustices. Later I will return to this
observation.
Ethical realism
In the Republic, Plato addressed the idea of justice. Plato’s
philosophic outlook was deeply inspired by mathematics.
Mathematics provided him with a context in which empiri-
cal validations are irrelevant, as mathematical statements
do not concern physical objects, but ideas. The world of
ideas was considered by Plato as being real. For instance, the
mathematical notion of triangle has a real reference, namely
the triangle that exists in the world of ideas. In fact, accord-
ing to Plato, any mathematical object has a real existence in
the world of ideas [2]. Plato’s conception of ideal references
reaches much further than mathematics. It also applies to a
notion like justice. Plato’s approach in clarifying any such
notion was to try to discover its proper reference in the
world of ideas.
By ethical realism I understand a position which shares
with Platonism the idea that it is possible to identify some
proper interpretations of ethical notions. However, in my
interpretation ethical realism need not assume the very exis-
tence of a world of ideas, but it assumes that it makes sense
to try to discover what, say, justice really means.
While the notion of ‘justice’ has been addressed since
antiquity, the notion of ‘social justice’ first appeared in the
19th century. This notion was coined by Luigi Taparelli, who
highlighted its religious features. From such a perspective,
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careful studies of the Bible. These ideas were explored fur-
ther in The Constitution Under Social Justice (Costituzione
secondo la giustizia sociale) written by Antonio Rosmini-
Serbati and first published in 1848. Here we find the notion
of social justice related to a range of political ideas circulat-
ing at the time, but simultaneously to strong religious
assumptions.
Classical Marxism does not explicitly address the notion of
social justice, but without great difficulties it is possible to
integrate the notion within a Marxist outlook. Thus, the cap-
italist order of things represents a profound degree of
injustice. This injustice, however, is temporary as, in the end,
the very logic of capital will destroy capitalism and make
space for a new order of social justice. Classical Marxism
operates with a version of ethical realism, to the extent that
it assumes it is possible to identify social injustices as well
as to discover proper directions for establishing social justice.
Ethical anarchism
A radical refusal of any version of ethical realism came from
Frederick Nietzsche who exercised an ethical anarchism. This
anarchism inspired the whole postmodern movement. Here,
however, let me concentrate on Nietzsche’s own anarchism.
Nietzsche claimed that Platonism represented the malig-
nant disease of philosophy. The Platonist concept of truth is
based on a distinction between appearance and reality,
claiming that true knowledge concerns reality whatever we
have to do with mathematics, ethics, or anything else. But,
according to Nietzsche, there is no reality behind appear-
ance: “The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘real’ world
has only been lyingly added…” (2003, §2). Lyingly added
by Platonism. There is no real world, no world of ideas,
which truth may refer to. Truth is not about anything. It has
no reference. It is an illusion. It is a way of talking. It is just
a “mobile army of metaphors” (2010, p. 29).
Such complete elimination of truth opens the way for the
most radical form of perspectivism. Concepts do not have
proper references; in fact they do not have any references.
Instead, they drift around in an open landscape of appear-
ances. There is no Archimedean point outside the stream of
life from where one can look at things, judge things, and for-
mulate true statements.
Nietzsche’ perspectivism concerns epistemology as well
as ethics, and he has only ironic remarks to make with ref-
erence to a conception such as democracy (1998). According
to Nietzsche, democracy is just a pitiable expression of slave
morality, which puts values upside down by celebrating the
poor, powerless, suffering, deprived, sick, ugly, etc., while
considering the noble, powerful, and beautiful to be evil,
cruel and lustful. Similar remarks can be made with respects
to other notions from the ethical domain as, for instance,
social justice. There is nothing to be celebrated with respect
to such a notion, and there is nothing to be discovered.
Social justice is just a mobile metaphor.
In terms of modernity and postmodernity
It is possible to associate ethical realism with a modern out-
look, and ethical anarchism with a postmodern outlook.
As a ‘modern departure’ for a mathematics education for
social justice, one could try to identify principal injustices in
society. One could explore: colonialism which leads to stig-
matising discourses, even after explicit colonial structures
have become dismantled; capitalism which maintains eco-
nomic suppression and exploitation in all spheres of life;
racism which seems to multiply in ever new discourses; and
sexism which seems able to  proliferate through a variety of
patterns of suppression. Such a departure is found in many
versions of mathematics education for social justice that, as
a consequence, can be seen as a realisation of a political
agenda. Such an agenda, then, might assume some of the
grand narratives of Modernity—to use a notion coined by
Jean-François Lyotard (1984)—in particular the narratives
inspired by Marxism or related positions. A ‘modern depar-
ture’ would tend to assume some validity of such narratives,
and in this sense embark on a version of ethical realism.
By not assuming any grand narratives, a ‘postmodern
departure’ for a mathematics education for social justice
might bring the discussion closer to ethical anarchism.
Inspired by the approach of Michel Foucault, Thomas Pop-
kewitz (2004) addresses the power dynamics that can be
associated with mathematics education. An overall obser-
vation he makes is that the format of the mathematics
curriculum serves particular interests and that mathematics
education turns into a procedure for making people govern-
able. Acknowledging this, it appears questionable what
‘progress’ and ‘making improvements’ might mean with
respect to mathematics education. With reference to Popke-
witz, working for social justice through mathematics
education becomes an expression of romanticism, negating
the power of the economic and political structures in which
mathematics education is encapsulated.
In the following section, I will try to open the way to a
third possible departure for interpreting mathematics edu-
cation for social justice, not assuming any ethical realism
nor any ethical anarchism. I want to open the way for a con-
structivism with respect to ethics, which I will refer to as
ethical constructivism. I will leave it as an open question to
what extent this constructivism relates to a modern or to a
post-modern outlook.
Mathematical constructivism
Constructivism is a well-elaborated position in the philoso-
phy of mathematics, and I will elaborate a little on this
position before I explore constructivism with respect to
social justice and ethical concepts in general.
The Intuitionism of L. E. J. Brouwer does not assume the
pre-existence of any mathematical reality. Instead, it claims
that mathematical objects are mental constructions. As a
consequence, a theorem like Goldbach’s conjecture, that is
still not proved or disproved, is neither true nor false. Only
a mathematical constructive process would provide the the-
orem with a definite truth value. Intuitionism seems ready to
follow Nietzsche’s attack on Platonism by claiming that the
mathematical reality has only been lyingly added.
In Proofs and Refutations, Imre Lakatos (1976) investi-
gates the dynamics of mathematical development in terms of
proofs and refutations, and in this way he contributes to a
further elaboration of constructivism. Lakatos talks about
proof-generated concepts, and he illustrates how such con-
cepts emerge through complex processes of interaction.
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Proof-generated concepts do not have any a priori references
to pre-existing mathematical objects, but they make new for-
mulations of theorems and lemmas possible and open for
new ways of proving.
Lakatos makes a careful study of Euler’s polyhedron the-
orem, and he shows how the very notion of polyhedron
develops through the process of proofs and refutations. The
mathematical object ‘polyhedron’ is not any well-defined
Platonic entity of which true properties gradually become
discovered. Rather, we are dealing with a mathematical con-
ception under construction—a construct whose properties
become established as part of the process. And this is the
general idea of mathematical constructivism: mathematical
objects become constructed, and through this process their
properties become formed. This applies not only to polyhe-
drons, but to any mathematical objects: vector spaces,
groups, real numbers, etc.
At the beginning of the 1930s, Ludwig Wittgenstein dis-
tanced himself from the philosophic perspective he had
expressed in Tractatus. During this intensively productive
intermezzo, he formulated a thoroughly constructivist view
of mathematics, his Remarks on the foundations of mathe-
matics, negating any version of Platonism. Wittgenstein
gave a series of lectures, and over a long period Allan Turing
joined in. Turing confronted Wittgenstein by expressing a
version of Platonism as broadly assumed among working
mathematicians. This was certainly experienced by Wittgen-
stein as a fruitful challenge, and once when Turing was not
able to join the lecture, Wittgenstein simply cancelled it
(Monk, 1990).
Wittgenstein claimed that any mathematical law is an
expression of social conventions. This, however, does not
mean that ‘anything goes’. The notion of social convention
does not make us slide deep into relativism. Let me illustrate
by comparing mathematics and language. In language, one
meets many rules and conventions, and one can make mis-
takes with respect to grammar and spelling. However,
grammatical rules and conventions do not represent any
grammatical Platonic reality; rather, they are formed through
a long process of social construction. Following Wittgen-
stein, what can be said about language applies as well to
mathematics. Mathematical laws are expressions of gram-
matical rules for the use of worlds like ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if...then’,
‘the following’, ‘in total’, etc. Such rules are developed dur-
ing time. Mathematical rules are not rooted in any Platonic
reality, but in social conventions [3].
Ethical constructivism 
I want to consider constructivism not only with respect to
mathematics but with respect to ethics as well. While math-
ematical constructivism concerns the formation of a concept
like polyhedron, ethical constructivism concerns the forma-
tion of a concept like social justice [4].
An important idea in ethical constructivism was presented
by John Rawls (1999). Let us imagine a meeting for the for-
mulation of principles of social justice. We assume that the
formulation of such principles cannot be justified by pre-
established references, but has to emerge from the meeting.
According to Rawls, this is possible on the proviso the meet-
ing takes place under two conditions: First, the people who
join the meeting are going to become members of the soci-
ety in which the formulated principles are going to be
implemented. Second, the people are not going to know in
advance which position they will come to occupy in society;
they will not know if they will become rich or poor, men or
women, adult or children, ill or healthy, disabled or not, etc.
Giving these two conditions, Rawls stipulates that the meet-
ing could result in a conception of social justice.
Rawls’ thought experiment illustrates that ethics can be
considered as having a discursive basis, assuming that a con-
ception of social justice emerges through interaction and
communication [5]. As the construction is supposed to take
place under conditions that never can be realised, I refer to
the Rawls’ meeting as an idealised meeting for constructing
a conception of social justice. However, could we imagine
a process of ethical constructions not located in an idealised
surrounding, but in real-life processes?
As a start, let us imagine a real-life meeting taking place
in the year 1700. The discussion may concern slaves, and
one might reach the conclusion that in a just society, every-
body (to be understood as every man) has the right to own
the same number of slaves. We can imagine a meeting taking
place the year 1800 addressing what social justice would
mean with respect to women. That social justice could have
anything to do with women’s right to vote would not occur
in the discussion. Instead, the debate might concern the type
of politeness that men should exercise with respect to
women; when to open the doors, what words to use, and how
deep to bow. We can imagine in the year 1900 the discussion
might emphasise that in a just society anybody suffering
from homosexuality have the right to an adequate treatment.
And one can imagine that in the year 2000 a meeting might
address what social justice means with respect to refugees.
Here, representatives from the Danish Government might
advocate that, in a just society, refugees’ jewellery should be
confiscated. We can think of any such meeting as real-life
meetings about social justice.
Considering such real-life meetings, we are reminded of
Nietzsche’s claim that there is no escape from the particu-
larities of perspectives. We are always submerged in a
network of preconceptions, stereotypes, and ideologies. Fol-
lowing Nietzsche, we are going to recognise that social
justice is a human, all too human, construction. It might
appear that ethical constructivism easily slides into ethical
anarchism. However, there is more to be said with respect
to real-life meetings for constructing conceptions of social
justice.
Classrooms as real-life meetings
Let me now return to the project Bolsa Familia, which
addressed a specific form of family support. However, the
project also addressed much broader issues: Is it fair that
people in poor conditions get such a support? What is the
cause of their misery? Who could be held responsible? What
about children in miserable positions? Could they be held
responsible? What to think of the unequal distribution of
wealth and resources? All such questions have to do with
conceptions of social justice.
In fact, I suggest that one interprets a project like Bolsa
Familia as having to do not only with learning about social
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issues but simultaneously with articulating conceptions of
social justice. I suggest that we think of a project work as
organised by Muzinatti as a real-life meeting for construct-
ing conceptions of social justice.
I do not interpret the project as first of all having to do
with teaching students about social issues. Rather, I see it
as providing a space for challenging pre-conceptions and
implicit conceptions of social justice. The students have not
experienced the economic difficulties that Bolsa Familia is
trying to compensate for. However, by putting this example
of family support on the agenda, the students’ conception
of what is just and fair might be reworked.
As already highlighted, the literature in mathematics edu-
cation for social justice is rich in examples of projects
addressing unemployment, taxation, sexism, racism, immi-
gration, etc. Let us consider a possible project about taxation,
which we could refer to as Tax Policy. Like Bolsa Familia,
Tax Policy could raise many issues concerning social jus-
tice: What should be subjected to taxation? What scale
should be used for income tax? Should everybody pay tax?
What parameters should be taken into account when income
tax is calculated? Marilyn Frankenstein has paid particular
attention to issues about taxation and pointed out: “I have
decided that community education about tax policy will now
become the focus of my professional work.” (2012, p. 49).
It is possible to elaborate Tax Policy as part of a political
agenda, and Frankenstein is explicit about this possibility.
She points out that “we teach categories of analysis and the-
ories of how society works” (2012, p. 54). However, I
suggest that a project such as Tax Policy can also be seen as
providing opportunities for the students to articulate and
reconsider their conceptions of social justice. Thus, discus-
sions about tax policy would make it possible for students
to formulate for themselves what a fair redistribution of eco-
nomic resources could mean, and what social justice could
mean in general.
I suggest interpreting projects like Tax Policy and Bolsa
Familia from the perspective of ethical constructivism. They
open up a way for constructive processes that lead students
to articulate conceptions of social justice.
A constructive process
Lakatos presents the constructive process through which
the notion of polyhedron becomes formed as guided by a
method of proofs and refutations. I do not have the aspira-
tion of being able to provide a similar method guiding the
formation of conceptions of social justice. However, I do not
see such a process as being ‘free’ in the sense that ‘anything
goes’. The real-life meetings for constructing conceptions of
social justice, as taking place in the classrooms, can include
many elements, and let me just refer to a few of them.
A rgumentation and information. Lakatos presents the
process through which the notion of polyhedron becomes
elaborated as being rich in argumentation. Similar observa-
tions can be made with respect to the construction of an
ethical notion such as social justice. Thus, the project Bolsa
Familia draws on information presented in figures and sta-
tistics, and it includes a range of argumentation. The
students came to know the actual amount of money provided
in family support. They had the possibility to compare this
with budgets from their own experiences. They gained new
insight into other peoples’ life-conditions. As a consequence,
they could revise some of their original claims about, for
example, poor people being lazy and not wanting to do any-
thing due to the family support they receive. In this way,
pre-established conceptions of social justice might be chal-
lenged and reformulated in a process rich in argumentation
and information.
Dialogue. Lakatos outlined the complex interaction that
takes place when mathematical notions develop, and he pre-
sented this historical process in the form of a dialogue taking
place in a classroom. My point is that such interaction is also
taking place when ethical conceptions are developed. I see
ethical constructions as taking place in a complex dialogic
process. This can be characterised in different ways; one is
found in Alrø and Skovsmose (2002) outlining dialogic acts
such as, for instance, listening, reformulating, and evaluating.
The interaction described by Muzinnati (in progress) with
respect to the project Bolsa Familia is of a dialogic nature.
Diversity. An important feature of Rawls’ idealised meet-
ing was that the people joining the meeting did not know
which position they were going to assume in society. Natu-
rally, there are no real-life possibilities for complying with
such an assumption. However, the assumption points in an
important direction: when social justice is addressed it is
important to consider a diversity of situations and life-con-
ditions and to articulate different perspectives. Such
diversity can be present in the classroom, either in terms of a
diversity among the students or in terms of a diversity of
information and perspectives addressed in the classroom.
Muzinatti articulated a diversity of perspectives in the upper-
middle-class classroom environment, and for me, diversity
is an important feature of a real-life meeting for the formu-
lation of conceptions of social justice.
Critical expressions of visions and hopes
Certainly, the students working with Bolsa Familia have
visions about the future, both with respect to personal pos-
sibilities and with respect to society. Visions need not be
explicitly formulated—they might be implicit, even
obscure—still they can be challenged. Visions can be elab-
orated and, maybe, transformed in new directions.
I see a close connection between visions for the future and
conceptions of social justice. In fact, I find that conceptions
of social justice represent condensed articulations of visions
for the future.
The project Tax Policy could address implications of a
change in the format of taxation. Paying particular attention
to such possibilities, one can see the project as including an
articulation of hopes for the future. Frankenstein, as well as
many others working with mathematics education for social
justice, is deeply inspired by the work of Paulo Freire who
talked about a pedagogy of hope. Following this line of
thought, I find that a mathematics education for social jus-
tice can be interpreted as an education, which addresses
visions and hopes for the future.
The notion of sociological imagination might be useful
for emphasising this idea. This notion was coined by Charles
Wright Mills (1959) capturing the idea that there are differ-
ent ways of looking at sociological observations. One can
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take them as given facts, but also as contingencies that could
be changed. One can think of sociological imagination as a
way of expressing alternatives to what is the case for the
moment. Sociological imagination is a way of expressing
visions and hopes. For instance, one can address the tax sys-
tem as a contingency that could be different. More generally,
I see conceptions of social justice as expressions of socio-
logical imagination.
Let me briefly return to the anarchist departure for a math-
ematics education for social justice. The reason that I do
not feel tempted to explore this line of thought further is
that I find it might lead to underestimation of the relevance
of sociological imagination and the related notions of
visions and hopes. I do not follow the line of thought that
might relegate sociological imagination to being an expres-
sion of romanticism. Instead, I find that such imagination is
crucial for the constructive processes that lead to concep-
tions of social justice [6].
Let me admit that the notion of critique has been over-
worked in philosophy and certainly also in my own writings.
But let me be excused; I like the notion. I want to talk about
critical constructivism and not just about constructivism in
order to emphasise that any human constructions are tenta-
tive and could turn out to include very problematic features.
In order to formulate a critical constructivism with respect
to mathematics, one needs to take an important step beyond
what both Lakatos and Wittgenstein are suggesting. One
needs to be open to the possibility of addressing constructed
mathematical concepts through profound critical investiga-
tions. Such critique concerns not only the formation of
mathematical knowledge, but also the possible applications
of such knowledge. Furthermore, one needs to consider not
only explicit applications, but as well the range of implicit
functions of mathematics knowledge and techniques in soci-
ety. This is crucial for critical constructivism with respect
to mathematics [7].
Critical constructivism also concerns ethics. As previ-
ously indicated, by imagining meetings taking place in the
years 1700, 1800, 1900 and 2000, one can conceive visions
and hopes as formulated from particular sets of preconcep-
tions. One cannot assume the existence of any overall
perspective that provides general justifications of visions
and hopes. Sociological imagination is tentative and pre-
liminary. It is in need of critique.
Mathematical as well as ethical constructions are sur-
rounded by huge uncertainties. In fact, I relate critique and
uncertainty closely [8]. A critical engagement is a profound
recognition of the uncertainties that accompany any con-
structive process, also processes that lead towards
conceptions of social justice.
Notes 
[1] For a full description of the project, see Muzinatti (in progress).
[2] Platonism with respect to mathematics has been broadly assumed and,
as emphasised by Hersh (1998), it makes part of the outlook of the work-
ing mathematician.
[3] The conception of social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics
is formulated explicitly by Ernest (1998). His presentation makes particular
references to Lakatos and Wittgenstein.
[4] A preliminary formulation of such ethical constructivism was outlined
in Skovsmose (2012).
[5] For a further elaboration of discourse ethics, see, for instance, Habermas
(1991).
[6] For a discussions of sociological imagination see also Skovsmose
(2011) and Skovsmose and Penteado (2016).
[7] In our upcoming book Philosophy of Mathematics, Ole Ravn and I
also address features of such a critique.
[8] See Skovsmose (2014)
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